This paper aims to characterize a class of stochastic differential games which satisfy the certainty equivalence principle, beyond the cases with quadratic, linear or logarithmic value functions. We focus on scalar games with linear dynamics in the players' strategies and with separable payoff functionals. Our approach uses an inverse problem to find a strictly concave utility function for which the game satisfies the certainty equivalence principle. Besides establishing necessary and sufficient conditions, the results obtained in this paper are also a tool for discovering new closed-form solutions, as we show in two specific applications: a generalization of a dynamic advertising model, and in a game of noncooperative exploitation of a productive asset.
Introduction
Many problems in economics, management and operations research are naturally modeled as differential games. See Long 1 and Jorgensen and Zaccour 2, 3 for recent updates of the literature on differential games. The aim of this paper is to identify games for which the certainty equivalence principle holds. According to Theil, 4 certainty equivalence means that a decision agent who maximizes expected utility and takes actions based on the information available at the time of taking the decision, may neglect the disturbances and to suppose that the uncertain elements are settled at their mean values. This is an important property, as it means that the equilibrium of the deterministic game is robust, in the sense that it continues to be optimal, even if the system becomes exposed to zero mean random shocks in the state variable. We say that a Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium (MPNE henceforth) is robust if it is also an MPNE of an associated stochastic differential game.
It is well known that linear quadratic stochastic dynamic games in which the random source is independent from both the state variable and the player's strategies, satisfy the certainty equivalence principle * . The question we address in this paper is whether the certainty equivalence principle holds in other classes of differential games, and how we can identify them. There are some results in this direction already. Games with linear value functions satisfy this principle. This is because the second-order derivatives of the value function are null, so the HamiltonJacobi-Bellman equation system is the same for both the deterministic and the stochastic game.
Relevant examples are Sorger, 6 where a non-linear marketing game of advertising is studied, and Yeung, 7 where a class of games with linear value functions is identified. In Kuwana, 8 it is shown that logarithmic utility is the only utility specification that satisfies this property in Merton's model with partially observable drift † . Our investigations show that, in a variety of games, beyond those with logarithmic, quadratic or linear value functions, the certainty equivalence principle holds. Our starting point, Theorem 2.1 establishes a necessary condition. It points out that, for an MPNE to be robust, it must be the case that changes in shadow prices have constant variance. Theorem 2.1 is complemented with Theorem 3.1, which solves an inverse problem to determine utility functions that make the certainty equivalence principle hold.
The study of inverse optimum problems in economics has a long history, starting with Hahn 9 and Kurz; 10 Chang 11 extended the approach to the stochastic optimal growth model, and He and Huang 12 discussed a quite general inverse Merton's model. When a policy function can be rationalized by a well behaved utility function (i.e., strictly concave), it means that the prescribed behavior is consistent with an optimizing behavior. Inverse problems are easily handled with the Euler-Lagrange system of equations that directly characterizes the MPNE. Working with these equations in stochastic differential games constitutes a novel approach introduced in Josa-Fombellida and Rincón-Zapatero. 13 It presents some advantages when studying questions like those we address here. The Euler-Lagrange system is obtained from the Hamilton-JacobiBellman system upon differentiation with respect to the state variables ‡ . Theorem 3.1 applies to a class of scalar games with linear dynamics in the strategies of the players. This class encompasses many interesting differential games. For instance, our method allows us to extend the aforementioned dynamic advertising model studied in Sorger 6 § and Prasad and Sethi. 17 In addition, we study the noncooperative management of a stochastic productive asset. We find that games with a linear recruitment function and constant elasticity of variance (a CEV model) satisfy certainty equivalence for constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility functions with a suitable coefficient of risk aversion. Our approach allows us to discover new solutions in closed-form that, to our knowledge, are not available in the literature ¶ .
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the definition of the game and to presenting some general results, including the Euler-Lagrange equations and the necessary ‡ Rincón-Zapatero 14 deals with deterministic games, allowing for non-smooth MPNE. See Josa-Fombellida and condition established in Theorem 2.1. Section 3 studies a class of scalar games with linear dynamics in the players' strategies that satisfies the certainty equivalence principle. Theorem 3.1 gives sufficient conditions for the existence of strictly concave utility functions for which the MPNE is robust. An explicit expression for the player's value function is also provided. Section 4 studies two applications: a general advertising game and a productive asset game.
Description of the game and general results
In this section, we briefly formulate a general stochastic differential game and provide results of
Euler-Lagrange equations that will be used along the paper. Standard references for differential games are Mehlmann, 18 Başar and Olsder 19 or Dockner et al. 20 We consider an N -person differential game over a bounded or unbounded time interval. In the former case, T denotes the final date. The state process, X(s) ∈ X ⊆ R n , satisfies the system of stochastic differential equations (SDEs henceforth)
Players' strategies are denoted by u i ∈ U i ⊆ R n , i = 1, . . . , N , and u = (u 1 , . . . , u N ) is a profile of strategies. As it is common in many games, we will assume that the equilibrium strategies are interior to U i for each i = 1, . . . , N . The random source is given by a d-dimensional Brownian motion w(s) defined on a suitable probabilistic space. The instantaneous utility function of player i is L i and the bequest function, S i . Given initial conditions (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × X and an admissible profile u, the payoff function of each player to be maximized is
where E tx denotes conditional expectation, given the initial condition X(t) = x. All functions that describe the game are of class C 2 , and ρ i ≥ 0 is the rate of discount, which is supposed to be strictly positive for all i in the infinite horizon case. In this case, the bequest functions S i are null.
for i = 1, . . . , N and (i) for every (t, x), (1) admits a pathwise unique strong solution;
(ii) for each i = 1, . . . , N, there exists a function φ i with φ i t , φ i tx and φ i xx continuous, such that
Let U i be the set of admissible strategies of player i and let
,
In the above definition, (
Along the paper, we will use subscripts to denote partial derivatives, and primes to denote scalar derivatives. Also, ∂ z denotes total derivation with respect to the variable z; and for a Given an MPNE φ, the value function of player i is
, and the costate function is
As shown in Josa-Fombellida and Rincón-Zapatero, 13 an interior and smooth MPNE φ satisfies the Euler-Lagrange system of differential equations
with final conditions φ i (T, x) = ϕ i (x), for j = 1, . . . , N , given implicitly by
. . , N and j = 1, . . . , n.
In the case where the game is autonomous, of infinite horizon, and the MPNE is stationary, the term ∂ t Γ i (x, φ(x)) = 0 vanishes. Now, consider the associated deterministic game by taking σ = 0, so that the state equation
with initial condition X(t) = x. The objective of the ith player is to maximize in
i = 1, . . . , N , once the remaining players have fixed their strategies u −i ∈ U −i .
Definition 2.3 (Robust MPNE)
We say that an MPNE of the associated deterministic game (6) is robust if it is also an MPNE of the stochastic game (1), (2).
Theorem 2.1 Suppose that φ is a robust MPNE of the deterministic game. Then there exist
Proof. System (4) also characterizes the deterministic game, which is obtained when σ is the null matrix. This is because the maximization condition of the Hamiltonian, for both the deterministic and the stochastic game, is the same, since σ is independent of the strategies of the players. This implies that Γ i (t, x, u) is also the costate variable of player i in the deterministic game. Hence, if φ is an MPNE of both the deterministic and the stochastic game, then the vector
must be null for all i = 1, . . . , N ; hence, tr (σσ )(t, x)∂ x Γ i (t, x, φ(t, x)) may depend only on t.
A class of differential games satisfying the certainty equivalence principle
From now on, we will focus on the infinite horizon game and on a particular class of stochastic differential games that satisfy the certainty equivalence principle. To carry out this identification,
we solve an inverse problem, which consists of, given the rest of the elements that define the game, finding well behaved utility functions (i.e smooth and strictly concave in each players' strategies) for which the certainty equivalence principle is satisfied. To do so, we use the EulerLagrange equation (4) for both the deterministic and the stochastic games, and the necessary condition established in Theorem 2.1.
The particular inverse problem we study can be described as follows. The functions involved have the degree of smoothness required in the previous section. Let the evolution of the scalar state variable be
where the functions a i and b are given and with a continuous derivative. We assume that the functions a i are not null. Moreover, they are monotone (not necessarily strictly) for all i = 1, . . . , N . The objective is to find a strictly concave utility function i (u i ) such that, given the functions h i (x), i = 1, . . . , N , the game with payoffs
admits a robust MPNE. Hence, the utility function is
Note that the game is autonomous, so we have eliminated the time dependence in the interval of integration and in the expectation. In what follows we will denote
the antiderivative of 1/σ 2 (x), with null constant.
Summing up, given the tuple ( 
for all x ∈ X , for i = 1, . . . , N .
Proof. If φ is a robust MPNE, then it satisfies the Euler-Lagrange equation (4) with σ = 0, which for this game becomes (we omit the dependence of the functions on x)
where
Moreover, a robust MPNE satisfies, by Theorem 2.1,
for some constant A i , and for all i = 1, . . . , N . Then, integrating in the expression above
Plugging (13) and (14) into (12), we obtain that φ satisfies the linear system of differential equations
Rearranging terms, we obtain (11).
Note that (11) is linear because the dynamics (8) is linear in the strategies of the players. We could have set a general dynamics, at the cost of dealing with a nonlinear system for the robust MPNE. As we wish, not only to give a theoretical result, but to find explicitly utilities and equilibria, we make the simplifying assumption (8) . Another advantage of our game problem specification is that, as the system is linear, suitable assumptions on the coefficients would guarantee the existence of a global solution, feature that is needed for the sufficient condition given in the following result. We use the notation ζ i for the inverse of φ i , that is, x = ζ i (φ i (x)), for x ∈ X , for i = 1, . . . , N . The inverse of φ i exists under the assumptions of the theorem below, and the monotonicity of functions a i and a i Θ. for all i = 1, . . . , N , are imposed in order to obtain functions i that are strictly concave.
Theorem 3.1 Suppose that a i Θ has a continuous derivative for all i = 1, . . . , N , where Θ is defined in (10) and that the functions a i and a i Θ are monotone, with at least one of them strictly monotone, for all i = 1, . . . , N . Let φ be a solution of the system (11) for which each φ i is twice continuously differentiable and strictly monotone in X , such that (8), with initial condition X(t) = x, admits a unique strong solution
with A i , B i constants, and let V i be defined by
and suppose that the following transversality condition holds: for all u i ∈ U i , lim inf
and lim sup
for i = 1, . . . , N . Then Proof. It is clear that i is twice continuously differentiable, for i = 1, . . . , N . Taking the derivative in (15) we obtain
Deriving again and collecting terms, we have
We want to show that it is possible to choose suitable constants A i and B i such that i (u i ) < 0, for i = 1, . . . , N . This will prove (a). Note that (ζ i ) has the same sign of (φ i ) . By assumption, this is positive or negative for all x ∈ X , since φ i is strictly monotone. Assume, without loss of generality, that (ζ i ) > 0 for some player i ∈ {1, . . . , N }. Since that both a i Θ and a i are monotone, and that at least one of these two functions is strictly monotone, it is possible to select constants A i = 0 and B i = 0 such that A i (a i Θ) ≤ 0 and B i a i ≤ 0 for all x ∈ X , and at least one of these two expressions is negative for all x ∈ X . Thus, i (u i ) < 0 as claimed. The case (ζ i ) < 0 is handled in the same way. This shows (a). We will prove (b) and (c) at once. We start by showing that (16) defines a solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations (HJB henceforth) of the stochastic differential game. To this end, let us compute the first and second derivatives of V . Note that, in fact, recalling that Γ i = A i Θ + B i , we have
Hence, given that φ satisfies (12)
. Then
which is null by (20) . Hence, we have proved
On the one hand, we have by definition that
0 for all u i , for all i = 1, . . . , N . Since the Hamiltonian
is strictly concave in u i because i is strictly concave, a critical point of the function u i −→
) is a (unique) global maximum. Hence
for all u i , i = 1, . . . , N . Thereby, the HJB equation for a MPNE,
holds. Finally, the transversality conditions (17) and (18) 
, as a candidate for robust control. 
where the coefficients are
.
An integrating factor is
In consequence, the general solution of (21) is
where C is an arbitrary constant. This is a candidate for robust MPNE, for the game with the utility function i as given in (15) . We will use this formula in Section 4.2 below. 
Examples
We analyze two stochastic differential games with a different structure. The value function of the first game is linear, which explains why the MPNE satisfies certainty equivalence. The second game's value function is of the CRRA family.
A dynamic advertising game
Consider the stochastic differential game of competitive dynamic advertising of two firms studied in Sorger 6 in its infinite horizon formulation. Two firms compete for market shares through advertising effort. We denote the market share of firm 1 at time t by X(t) and assume that the size of the total market is constant over time. Normalizing the total market to 1, we obtain that 1 − X(t) is the market share of firm 2 at time t. Let us denote then X 1 (t) = X(t) and X 2 (t) = 1 − X(t), so X i (t) represents the market shares of firm i at time t. The objective functional for firm i is
, and dynamics
, where m i > 0, for i = 1, 2. The cost function C i has to be determined so that the MPNE of the game is robust. The model specification in Sorger 6 is obtained with
and m 1 = m 2 = 1, δ 1 = δ 2 = 1, δ = 0. Prasad and Sethi 17 allows for δ 1 , δ 2 , δ > 0. In the above, u i (t) is the advertising rate at time t, ρ i > 0 is the constant discount rate and q i > 0 is the constant revenue per unit of market share of firm i, for i = 1, 2. The diffusion parameter σ(x) ≥ 0 satisfies σ(0) = σ(1) = 0. The state dynamics reflects two facts, already present in the classical Vidale-Wolfe advertising model, Vidale and Wolfe: 22 (i) a concave saturation effect in the capture of new costumers, and (ii) a positive (resp. negative) effect of own (resp. competitor) advertising spending. In comparison with the original game, we allow here for asymmetric market responses, even if the advertising effectiveness parameters δ 1 and δ 2 are equal. The churn parameter δ > 0, accounts for declining effects in market shares due to other causes than advertising from the competitor firm, such as product obsolescence or lack of product differentiation.
In the notation of Section 3,
and
Linear value functions require (see Remark 3.3)
for suitable constants B 1 > 0, B 2 < 0, so (7) is satisfied independently of σ(x). We still have to check that the these two strategies solve the system (11), which in this particular game become (with A i = 0)
The structure of these equations suggests a solution (u 1 , u 2 ) of the form
1+m 2 , with η i > 0, i = 1, 2. After substitution and collection of terms, the above differential system reduces to the following pair of algebraic relations
m 2 , the inverse functions of u 1 and u 2 , respectively.
From (15), we have the cost functions (remember that A i = 0)
, then both c 1 , c 2 > 0. Solving for B 1 and B 2 and plugging these values into the system (22), we obtain 
A stochastic productive asset game
In this section, we consider an N player symmetric noncooperative differential game where each player i consumes at rate c i ≥ 0 from a stochastic productive asset X. The payoff functional is
Function F is the recruitment/production function. The class of admissible strategies U i for each player is as in Definition 2.1, with the additional condition that X ≥ 0 almost sure is required, that is to say X = [0, ∞). Further conditions on U i will be given in each of the specific cases we consider below. This game has been analyzed in Josa-Fombellida and Rincón-Zapatero, 13 where we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of a unique and smooth MPNE of the finite horizon game.
According to Remark 3.2, and taking B = 0, a robust equilibrium must satisfy (21) with
Recall that Θ is the primitive of 1/σ 2 (x) with null constant. We consider a linear production function , F (x) = µx, µ ≥ 0, and assume a CEV model, σ(x) = σx a , with 1 − 1 2N < a < 1 and
Function Θ is negative since a > The constraints on a imply 1 − 1 N < θ < 1. In terms of θ, the diffusion coefficient is then
We have also solved the inverse problem for linear F and σ, as well as for a square root recruitment function, F (x) = µ √ x, and linear σ. Readers interested in the details will receive a copy of our computations and proof of optimality upon request.
σ(x) = σx (1+θ)/2 . At equilibrium, the asset evolves according to the SDE
Regarding the existence of solutions to (25) , the functions 1/σ 2 (x) and x/σ 2 (x) are locally integrable Borel functions in (0, ∞). Indeed, both functions are continuous on any compact subset of (0, ∞), and are thus integrable. Hence, the SDE (25) is a uniformly integrable martingale, since 1+θ 2 < 1. This implies thatX ∈ (0, ∞) with probability one, see Theorem 2.1 in Mijatović and Ususov. 25 In consequence, V (X c i (T )) is well defined and V (X c i (T )) ≥ V (X(T )) ≥ 0 a.e., so (17) in Theorem 3.1 trivially holds. On the other hand, X φ ≤X, where dX(s) = µX(s)ds + σX(s) (1+θ)/2 dw(s), andX(0) = x. Note that e −µtX (t) = x+σ t 0 e −µsX (1+θ)/2 (s)dw(s) is a nonnegative local martingale, thus a supermartingale, hence E x (e −µTX (T )) ≤ x. This implies that X φ does not exit at ∞. Moreover, since the value function is increasing and concave, then
by Jensen's inequality. Thus, condition (18) holds, as we have supposed ρ > µ(1 − θ).
Conclusions
This paper studies whether the certainty equivalence property holds in games beyond the wellknown linear quadratic case and games with linear or logarithmic value functions. To approach the problem through the value function and the HJB equations is not easy, at least when the diffusion coefficient depends on the state variable, since then-with the exception of games where the value function is linear-the value function will be different in the stochastic and in the deterministic case. Hence, we have chosen to work with the Euler-Lagrange equations, which deal directly with the MPNE. As the MPNE is the same for both games, the deterministic and the stochastic, these equations provide a convenient tool to solve the problem. We have shown how our approach can be used to find closed-form solutions to games for which a solution was not known. We will try to explore this feature in new examples. Also, further research will focus on analyzing games where the uncertainty is other than Brownian uncertainty.
